Cases, Regulations and Statutes by Achenbach, Robert P., Jr.
Volume 7 | Number 2 Article 2
1-26-1996
Cases, Regulations and Statutes
Robert P. Achenbach Jr.
Agricultural Law Press, robert@agrilawpress.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Achenbach, Robert P. Jr. (1996) "Cases, Regulations and Statutes," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 7 : No. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol7/iss2/2
10                                                                                                                                                                 Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 8 Harl, Agricultural Law § 58.05[2][c]
(1995); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 7.02[5][d]
(1995).
2 See generally 5 Harl, Agricultural Law § 43.03[2]
(1995); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 5.03[2] (1995).
3 See Est. of Ford v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1993-580,
aff'd, 53 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1995) (20 percent discount
for minority interest and 10 percent for non-
marketability; net asset value methodology used); Luton
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1994-539 (10, 15 and 20 -
percent discounts allowed for different corporations for
non-marketability; 20 percent discount allowed for one-
third minority interest in one corporation in addition to
15 percent lack of marketability discount); Est. of Frank
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-132 (discounts allowed for
minority ownership and lack of marketability in closely-
held family corporation). See also Est. of Berg v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-279, aff'd on these issues,
976 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1992) (estate entitled to 20
percent minority discount and 10 percent for lack of
marketability for 26.9 percent interest in closely-held
real estate holding company).
4 Propstra v. U.S., 680 F.2d 1248) (9th Cir. 1982).
5 See, e.g., Est. of Youle v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1989-
138 (discount of 12-1/2 percent allowed for tenancy in
common ownership); Est. of Cervin v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-550, appeal docketed, 5th Cir. August 31,
1995) (20 percent discount allowed for 50 percent
interest in farm and homestead). But see Ltr. Rul.
9336002, May 28, 1993 (discount should be limited to
cost of partitioning property).
6 See, e.g., Est. of Pittsbury v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-
425 (15 percent discount allowed for undivided 77
percent and 50 percent interests in real estate).
7 I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(2).
8 I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(7). See 5 Harl, supra n. 2, §
43.03[2][b].
9 I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(8). See 5 Harl, supra n. 2, §
43.03[2][c].
10 See Hartley, "Final Regs. Under 2032A: Who, What and
How to Qualify for Special Use Valuation," 53 J. Tax.
306, 308 (1980) (range from 29 percent to 76 percent by
IRS District).
11 Est. of Maddox v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 228 (1989).
12 Id.
13 See Ltr. Rul. 9119008, Jan. 31, 1991.
14 102 T.C. 777 (1994).
15 Id.
16 Hoover v. Comm'r, 68 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 1995).
17 Supra n. 11.
18 Supra n. 16.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors farmed land leased
from a related person on a 60/40 crop share basis. The land
owner had a mortgage against the farm under a note co-
signed by the debtors and the debtors had made all the
payments on the note. The debtors' Chapter 12 plan provided
for payment of the note in full. The lender initiated a
foreclosure action against the land owner without first
seeking relief from the automatic stay. The court held that,
although it would have been prudent for the lender to first
seek relief from the automatic stay, the foreclosure suit did
not violate the stay because the suit was against a nondebtor
and would not affect the debtors' rights under the lease. In re
Smith, 189 B.R. 11 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1995).
CLAIMS. A secured creditor had obtained a pre-petition
judgment of foreclosure against the debtor but the
foreclosure sale was stayed by the debtor's bankruptcy
petition. The Bankruptcy Court set a bar date for creditors'
claims and the order required all disputed claims to be filed
by the bar date and made all creditors responsible for
verifying the accuracy of claims filed by the debtor. The
creditor obtained relief from the automatic stay and
proceeded with the foreclosure sale. Once the sale was
completed and the deficiency amount determined, the
creditor finally filed a claim, more than one month after the
claims bar date. The creditor sought approval for the late
filing under Bankr. Rules 9006(b)(1) for excusable neglect
or 3003(c)(3) for good cause. The Bankruptcy Court held
that the late filing was allowed under Rule 3003 because the
delay in filing was caused by the creditor's waiting for the
foreclosure sale to be completed in order to determine the
amount of the claim. The District Court reversed, holding
that Rule 3003 could not be used to allow the late filing,
under Pioneer Inv. Services v. Brunswick, 507 U.S. 380
(1993). In addition, the District Court held that the creditor
did not comply with the Rule 9006 excusable neglect
standard because the creditor intentionally delayed the claim
filing until after the foreclosure sale. Agribank v. Green,
188 B.R. 982 (C.D. Ill. 1995).
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS. The debtor
had operated a trucking business at a facility leased from a
creditor. The lease provided that the debtor was responsible
for any costs of cleaning up environmental damage caused
by the debtor during the lease. After the debtor filed for
bankruptcy, the lease was rejected by the debtor and the
landlord had the property inspected for environmental
damage. The state (New Jersey) environmental quality
agency required a number of cleanup actions and the
landlord sought recovery of those costs as administrative
expenses. The court held that the cleanup costs were not
entitled to administrative priority because the costs were
incurred post-petition and the environmental hazards were
not an imminent hazard to public health and safety. In re
McCrory Corp., 188 B.R. 763 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1995).
EXEMPTIONS
IRA. The debtor claimed a federal exemption for the
debtor's interest in an IRA. The trustee objected to the
exemption on the basis that the debtor was not entitled to
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current distributions from the IRA. The court held that a
right to current distributions was not a requirement for
claiming an exemption for an IRA. In re Marsella, 188
B.R. 731 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. Although the IRS received notice of the
claims bar date of April 1993, the IRS did not file its priority
tax claim until October 1994, but still prior to final
distribution of the estate property. The Bankruptcy Court
allowed the claim but subordinated the claim to the level of
a general unsecured claim. The District Court reversed,
holding that an untimely priority tax claim was not
automatically barred from priority status. However, the
court indicated that the Bankruptcy Court would have, on
remand, the equitable authority to subordinate the claim
based on its tardiness. The court also noted that a 1994
amendment to Section 726(a) provides for allowance of
untimely filed priority tax claims if the claim is filed prior to
distribution of the estate. Pub. L. 103-394, Sec. 213, 108
Stat. 4126 (1994). In re Lee, Inc., 189 B.R. 1 (D. R.I.
1995).
PRIORITY. The debtors were assessed additional taxes
for investment in tax shelters and were assessed interest
under I.R.C. § 6621(d) for substantial underpayment of
taxes attributable to tax motivated transactions. The IRS
included the interest in its priority claim and the debtors
objected that the interest assessed was actually a penalty and
not entitled to priority status. The court held that the Section
6621 assessment was interest because the purpose of the
assessment was to increase taxation of taxpayers who use
tax motivated abusive tax shelters. In re Hall, 96-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,031 (Bankr. D. Alas. 1995).
CONTRACTS
TERMINATION. The plaintiff operated a farm
equipment dealership under a written agreement with the
defendant, a manufacturer of the equipment sold by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's agent
orally promised that the relationship would continue as long
as the plaintiff met the sales targets set by the defendant.
However, the written agreement between the parties stated
that the agreement could be terminated by either party with
six months' notice and for any reason. Although the
agreement was extended to one at will, the defendant
eventually notified the plaintiff that the agreement would be
terminated and another dealer in the area would carry the
defendant's products. The plaintiff claimed the defendant
breached the oral agreement and failed to compensate
adequately the plaintiff for expenses incurred in reliance on
the expected continuing relationship. The court held that the
Michigan Farm and Utility Equipment Franchise Act
applied to the agreement because the plaintiff paid for
services required by the defendant to continue the
dealership. The court also held that an issue of fact remained
as to whether the termination of the agreement was
discriminatory under the franchise law. The court agreed
with the plaintiff that an issue of fact remained as to whether
the termination of the contract occurred before the plaintiff
had sufficient time and opportunity prior to the termination
to recoup costs incurred at the requirement of the defendant.
Because the plaintiff had made claims of fraud and
misrepresentation by the defendant in making and
terminating the contract, the court denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment as to punitive damages.
Tractor & Farm Supply v. Ford New Holland, 898 F.
Supp. 1198 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS. The plaintiff was a rancher who also
performed cattle brokering services. The plaintiff agreed to
act as a broker for another cattle owner and found a buyer
for the cattle. The plaintiff negotiated the sale with the
buyer's broker. The cattle were tested and 14 were found to
be suspected vectors of brucellosis. Although the cattle
owners were notified for the test results, the plaintiff was
not. Some of the cattle were loaded for shipment and the
plaintiff accompanied the trucks to a veterinarian to pick up
the health certificates. The plaintiff did not look at the
certificates, which were incomplete because of a failure to
identify each animal by an eartag. The shipment with the
incomplete certificates violated 9 C.F.R. § 78.9(b)(3)(ii).
The plaintiff's involvement with the second shipment of
cattle involved transporting the buyer, the buyer's broker and
a veterinarian to the seller's ranch for an inspection. Some of
the cattle in the second load had not been tested for
brucellosis within 30 days prior to shipment, in violation of
9 C.F.R. § 78.9(b)(3)(ii). The plaintiff was cited for
"moving" cattle interstate in violation of the regulations
cited above. Although the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
dismissed the case against the plaintiff, the Judicial Officer
(JO) reversed, holding that the term "moved" included
"indirectly aiding, inducing or otherwise causing movement"
sufficient to include the plaintiff's actions involving the two
shipments. The court reversed, holding that the plaintiff's
involvement with the shipments was too attenuated to
support liability for the violations. Culbertson v. USDA, 69
F.3d 463 (10th Cir. 1995).
CHEESE. The defendant was a corporation which
operated a cheese processing and distribution activity. The
defendant's facility was inspected by FDA inspectors who
found unsanitary conditions resulting from insects, lack of
washing facilities, unsanitary employee habits, and
numerous unsanitary work procedures. The inspectors found
cheese contaminated with Listeria monocytogenes (L.
mono.). A return inspection found L. mono. in the insects,
on the floors and on equipment in the facility. Although
informed about the problem, the defendant failed to take any
remedial action and the FDA cited the defendant for
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331 for introduction of adulterated
food into interstate commerce. The defendant argued that it
did not adulterate the cheese because the L. mono. was not
intentionally added and that the cheese curing process was
supposed to kill the L. mono. bacteria. The court held that
the adulteration for purposes of the statute could occur by
the failure to maintain sanitary conditions and that the
defendant's failure to apply even minimal remedies to the
known unsanitary conditions and procedures causing the
contamination was a clear violation of the statute. The case
is remarkable for the number and extent of the unsanitary
conditions and extent of the contamination. It should not be
read after eating cheese. United States v. Union Cheese
Co., 902 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
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DISASTER ASSISTANCE. The plaintiff operated a
fruit farm and suffered loss of apple trees from fire blight in
1991. The plaintiff applied for disaster relief under the Tree
Assistance Program, Section 2255 of the FACT Act 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3974 (1990). The ASCS
(now FSA) denied the application because fire blight was
not included in the tree losses covered by the Act. Section
2255 states that reimbursement of the cost of replacing trees
is available for trees lost due to "freeze, earthquake, or
related condition." The plaintiff argued that the definition of
"related condition" found in Section 2251 also applied to
Section 2255, because the Section 2251 provision states that
it applied to the whole chapter of the Act. Section 2255 is in
subchapter B and Section 2251 is in subchapter A, both of
which are in Chapter 3 of the Act. The court noted that the
references to chapter and subchapter were not consistent
throughout the Act; therefore, reliance on the use of the
word "chapter" in section 2251 was insufficient to
demonstrate that the definition of "related condition" in
Section 2251 also applied in Section 2155. Thus, the court
held that the ASCS properly denied reimbursement
assistance to the plaintiff for the losses from fire blight.
Teichman v. Espy, 899 F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
INSPECTOR GENERAL. The plaintiffs were sheep
and goat ranchers who had participated in the wool and
mohair price support programs for several years. The
Inspector General's Office (IGO) of the USDA initiated an
audit of the plaintiffs' business to determine whether the
plaintiffs had complied with the program requirements,
including the payment limitation provisions.  The plaintiffs
complied with all document requests from the IGO until the
FSA also started an audit of the plaintiffs' compliance with
the wool and mohair programs. The IGO issued
administrative subpoenas to enforce its document requests
and the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the
IGO did not have the authority to conduct the audit.
Although the subpoenas contained boilerplate language that
the subpoenas were necessary for the performance of the
IGO's responsibilities for detecting fraud in the programs
and administration of the USDA operations, the court held
that the IGO did not have the authority to conduct what in
actuality was a compliance review of the plaintiffs, which
was strictly within the authority of the FSA. Winters Ranch
Partnership v. Viadero, 901 F. Supp. 237 (W.D. Tex.
1995).
MILK. Vermont passed a labeling law which required
milk and milk product retailers to identify through signs and
stickers (i.e., no product label changes were required) the
milk and milk products which were produced from cows
which had been injected with recombinant bovine growth
hormone (rBST). The plaintiffs were various trade
associations representing retailers and milk producers. The
plaintiffs alleged that the labeling law violated the First
Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and sought a preliminary injunction. The
defendant, Vermont, stated that the purpose of the labeling
law was to inform consumers so that the consumers could
make purchases based on their concerns about rBST
treatment of cows and the economic and health concerns
from such treatment. The court denied the injunction
because the plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm or
likelihood of success on the merits. The court found that the
costs of such labeling were minimal and easily recouped
from a minimal increase in the cost of milk products. The
court noted that the increase of production from rBST-
treated cows could decrease the cost of such milk products,
thus increasing the sales and profits of retailers. The
plaintiffs also alleged that even the minimal  loss of First
Amendment freedoms was sufficient harm to support an
injunction. The court held that the labeling law does not
curtail any speech but only requires truthful statements
about the milk products. The court also held that the
plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits because
the labeling law did not discriminate against out-of-state
producers by favoring in-state producers, since all producers
are subject to the same labeling requirements and both in-
state and out-of-state producers produce both kinds of milk
products. The court also noted that the state had a legitimate
interest in providing its consumers with full information
about retail products and that the labeling law was passed in
response to a variety of public concerns over milk products
from rBST treated cows. The court held that the labeling law
did not violate the First Amendment because the speech
involved here was commercial speech which could be
restricted by a substantial governmental interest, such as
truthfully informing consumers. International Dairy Foods
Ass'n v. Amestoy, 898 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1995).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* The plaintiff was a licensed PACA
produce dealer. A friend of the plaintiff was an officer and
more than 10 percent owner in a PACA licensee which had
filed to make payments in several reparations cases and
which then ceased operations. The friend sought
employment with the plaintiff who hired the friend to
perform various tasks. The USDA informed the plaintiff that
the friend was determined to be a person responsibly
connected to the licensee and employment of the friend was
prohibited without permission from the USDA. The USDA
allowed the employment of the friend if the plaintiff first
obtained a $100,000 bond. The plaintiff made several
attempts to obtain a bond over several months but eventually
found a bond too expensive and terminated the friend's
employment instead. During the several months of bond
seeking, the plaintiff continued to employ the friend even
after  repeated warnings from the USDA that employment of
the friend without a bond violated PACA. The ALJ had
imposed a 30 day suspension for the plaintiff's failure to
obtain a bond within 30 days after receiving notice that
employment of the friend without a bond would violate
PACA. The plaintiff argued that the circumstances
warranted allowing the plaintiff more time to obtain the
bond. The ALJ and JO ruled that the 30 day requirement
was statutory and the statute did not provide any authority
for extending the period. However, the JO increased the
suspension to 90 days because the employment of the friend
threatened to undermine PACA's purposes. The appellate
court affirmed on the ruling that the plaintiff violated PACA
but reduced the suspension to the original 30 days because
the plaintiff made a good faith effort to obtain a bond, the
employment of the friend did not threaten the produce
industry because the friend did not have sufficient authority
in the plaintiff's business, the plaintiff had an exemplary
business record under PACA, and the 90 day suspension
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would destroy the plaintiff's business.  Conforti v. U.S., 69
F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 54 Agric. Dec. 649 (1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* The taxpayer's father entered into a
earnest money contract to purchase land under a joint
venture. The father arranged for an agent to represent the
taxpayer and another child and to hold interests in the joint
venture for the children. The agent sent a letter to the
mother, explaining the agency arrangement. The interests
were eventually sold with the taxpayer and the other sibling
receiving promissory notes for their interests in the property.
The notes were eventually paid and the taxpayer endorsed
the check as satisfying the note obligation. The issue was
who was taxable on the note proceeds. The court held that
the father had made a gift of the interests to the children
when the earnest money contract was executed and the
agency created. Streber v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-
601.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX. The
decedent owned all of the stock in five corporations which
owned commercial and residential rental properties. The
decedent also owned a 50 percent interest in a partnership
which also owned similar property. Until four years before
death, when an illness incapacitated the decedent, the
decedent actively participated in the management of the
properties, either through personal activities or through
employees. After the illness, the decedent's management
duties were performed by the decedent's spouse and son.
The IRS ruled that the decedent's interests in the
corporations and partnership were interests in closely-held
business for purposes of installment payment of estate tax.
The IRS ruled that the activities of the employees,spouse
and son, were attributed to the corporations and partnership.
Ltr. Rul. 9602017, Oct. 11, 1995.
POWER OF ATTORNEY. The decedent had
established a revocable trust for the benefit of the decedent
with the decedent as trustee. The trust provided that the
trustee had the power to revoke the trust or remove all trust
property at any time. The trust also provided that the power
of revocation could be exercised by the decedent only and
could not be exercised by any agent or conservator. The
decedent executed a power of attorney naming a daughter as
attorney-in-fact. The power of attorney gave the daughter
the authority to "fund a previously created living trust or
create different forms of property ownership…and to do and
perform…every act and thing which may be required or
necessary to be done in carrying out the authority granted
herein, to conduct, manage and control all my business and
my property…with authority to execute and acknowledge
any and all instruments necessary or power to carry out the
powers enumerated herein." The decedent executed a second
power of attorney authorizing the same daughter to make
gifts on the decedent's behalf. The second power also
included the "power and authority to perform all and every
act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done
in and about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes
as I might or could do if personally present." The daughter
then withdrew funds from the revocable trust and
established irrevocable trusts for the heirs of the decedent
and excluded the funds in the irrevocable trusts from the
decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. The
IRS ruled that under state law, the trust provision prohibiting
alteration of the trust or removal of property from the trust
except by the decedent personally controlled over the
powers of attorney executed by the decedent; therefore, the
daughter did not have the authority to remove the trust funds
and establish the irrevocable trusts and the funds were
included in the decedent's gross estate.  Ltr. Rul. 9601002,
Sept. 22, 1995.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
IRS ON THE INTERNET.  The IRS is now available
on the Internet through the World Wide Web
(http://www.irs.ustreas.gov) with its own home page. The
IRS may also be accessed by direct dial up (no parity, 8 data
bits, 1 stop bit) at 1-703-321-8020 and entering "guest" at
the prompt. The main internet address by Telnet is
ins.irs.ustreas.gov. Through these access points, online
users can order forms, obtain plain English descriptions of
treasury regulations, and find answers on over 140 topics.
ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME. The taxpayer was a
lawyer employed by the State of New York. The taxpayer
agreed to represent the taxpayer's sister in a malpractice suit
against a hospital for personal injuries. The taxpayer also
engaged an independent law firm to represent the sister and
agreed to split the contingency fee with the law firm. The
suit was eventually settled and the settlement included a
waiver of the taxpayer's portion of the fees to the sister. The
court order incorporating the settlement also referred to the
waiver of the fees. The taxpayer did not include the fees in
gross income and the sister also excluded from income the
waived fees as a part of the recovery for personal injuries.
The court held that the waiver was an assignment of income
and included the fees in the gross income of the taxpayer
because the fees were earned by the taxpayer for the work in
the case. Sutherland v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-1.
C CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
REORGANIZATIONS. The taxpayer was a farm
corporation owned by six shareholders. Disagreements by
three shareholders over management, operation and general
business philosophy caused the shareholders to split the
corporation into three corporations. The reorganization was
accomplished by distributing assets to the new corporations
in exchange for stock and then distributing that stock to the
shareholders of the original corporation. After the
reorganization, each of the three disagreeing shareholders
owned a controlling interest in one of the resulting
corporations, with the other three shareholders having an
interest in all three corporations generally equal to their
interests in the original corporation. The IRS ruled that the
reorganization qualified as a "Type D" reorganization under
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) such that no gain or loss was
recognized and the basis and holding periods of corporation
property carried over to the new corporations. Ltr. Rul.
9601045, Oct. 10, 1995.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-ALM §
4.02[15].* The IRS has adopted as final regulations relating
to information reporting requirements of financial entities
discharging $600 or more of indebtedness per year per
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debtor. The regulations provide that the date of discharge for
information reporting purposes occurs when an identifiable
event occurs after which the debt no longer need be paid.
Such events include (1) a discharge in bankruptcy, (2) a
cancellation or extinguishment of an indebtedness that
renders a debt unenforceable in a receivership, foreclosure,
or similar proceeding; (3) a cancellation or extinguishment
of an indebtedness upon the expiration of a statute of
limitations for collection of an indebtedness or bringing an
action or claim; (4)  a cancellation or extinguishment of an
indebtedness pursuant to an election of foreclosure remedies
that bars the collection of the indebtedness; (5)  a
cancellation or extinguishment of an indebtedness that
renders a debt unenforceable pursuant to a probate
proceeding; (6)  a discharge of an indebtedness pursuant to
an agreement between an applicable financial entity and a
debtor for less than full consideration; (7) a discharge of
indebtedness pursuant to a decision by the creditor or the
application of a defined policy of the debtor not to continue
collection activity; and (8) the expiration of the nonpayment
testing period. The testing period referred to in item (8) is
36-months increased by the number of calender months
during all or part of which the creditor was precluded from
engaging in collection activity by operation of law. If a
discharge of indebtedness occurs in connection with a
foreclosure or abandonment of secured property reportable
under I.R.C. § 6050J, only a reporting under these
regulations by Form 1099-C is required. The regulations are
effective for debt discharges occurring after December 21,
1996. Until that date, the temporary regulations and Notice
94-73 remain in effect. Note: A future issue of the Digest
will publish an article by Dr. Harl on these regulations. 61
Fed. Reg. 262 (Jan. 4, 1996).
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer was
employed full time as an airline pilot and worked in the off
hours on a wind powered ethanol plant in the taxpayer's
back yard. The District Court had disallowed deductions for
expenses associated with the construction of the plant
because the endeavor was not entered into with the intent to
make a profit. The court found that the plant had not
produced any ethanol and was unlikely to do so, the
taxpayer had not consulted with experts or kept informed as
to developments in the field, and that the plant was merely a
model. The appellate court affirmed in a decision designated
as not for publication. Piszczek v. U.S., 96-1 U.S Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,016 (7th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
¶ 50,185 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
IRA. The taxpayer was 52 years old in 1995 and began
monthly distributions from an IRA. The distributions were
determined using a life expectancy of 31.3 years based on
Table V of Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9. The interest rate was 8.8
percent. The payments were determined as of the IRA
balance on December 31, 1994 and were to be same for each
month for the duration of the 31.3 years. The IRS ruled that
the distributions were substantially equal periodic payment
and not subject to the 10 percent additional tax of I.R.C. §
72(t), so long as the distributions meet the modification
requirements of I.R.C. § 72(t)(4). Ltr. Rul. 9601052, Oct.
12, 1995.
INTEREST. The taxpayers were assessed a deficiency
and interest after an audit of their personal and business
returns. The taxpayers allocated a portion of the interest as a
business interest deduction but the IRS disallowed the
deduction under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A).
The court held that the regulation was invalid and allowed
the deduction. Note: A future issue of the Digest will
publish an article by Dr. Harl on this issue. Redlark v.
Comm'r, 106 T.C. No. 2 (1996).
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.03[12].* The
taxpayer was a publicly owned corporation which operated
child care centers. The taxpayer claimed investment tax
credit for wall panels used for writing, mansard roof
systems, playground fencing, exterior lighting systems,
handicap restroom accessories, grease traps in the kitchen,
thermal recovery systems and split door systems. The court
held that the property items were not eligible for investment
tax credit because the property items were integrated into
the building structures so that the property was structural
components. La Petite Academy v. U.S., 96-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,020 (8th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 95-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,193 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
LETTER RULINGS. The IRS has issued its annual list
of procedures for issuing letter rulings. Rev. Proc. 96-1,
I.R.B. 1996-1, 8.
The IRS has issued its annual list of procedures for
furnishing technical advice to District Directors and Chiefs,
Appeals Offices. Rev. Proc. 96-2, I.R.B. 1996-1, 60.
    The IRS has issued its annual list of tax issues for which
the IRS will not give advance rulings or determination
letters. Rev. Proc. 96-3, I.R.B. 1996-1, 82.
The IRS has issued procedures for issuing determination
letters on the qualified status of employee plans under
Sections 401(a), 403(a), 409 and 4975(e)(7). Rev. Proc. 96-
6, I.R.B. 1996-1, 151.
The IRS has issued revised fee schedules for issuing
determination letters on the qualified status of employee
plans under Sections 401(a), 403(a), 409 and 4975(e)(7).
Rev. Proc. 96-8, I.R.B. 1996-1, 187.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayer owned land
used for cattle grazing and duck hunting. The taxpayer
granted to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) a
conservation easement over the property which prevented
the taxpayer from altering the character of the land and
allowed the FWS rights to water on the property in
maintaining the property as a seasonable waterfowl habitat.
The taxpayer retained the right to hunt and operate a hunting
club on the property and the right to all subsurface minerals.
State law recognized the conservation easement as a right in
property. The taxpayer entered into a multi-party exchange
transaction under which the FWS obtained replacement
property which the taxpayer would use in a trade or
business. The IRS ruled that the exchange of a conservation
easement for a fee interest in trade or business property was
a like-kind exchange eligible for nonrecognition of gain or
loss. Ltr. Rul. 9601046, Oct. 10, 1995.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
BASIS OF PARTNER'S INTEREST. The taxpayers
were equal partners in a partnership. The partnership
donated partnership property to a charitable organization,
with the property having a basis less than its fair market
value and not subject to liabilities. The IRS ruled that the
basis of each partner's interest in the partnership is reduced
by the partner's share of the basis in the partnership property
donated. Rev. Rul. 96-11, I.R.B. 1996-4.
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A partnership was comprised of a 75 percent partner and
a 25 percent partner. The 75 percent partner was also a 60
percent partner of another partnership, with a 40 percent
partner. The first partnership sold property to the second
partnership for less than its basis in the property. The loss on
the sale would be disallowed because a person owned at
least 50 percent of each partnership. The IRS ruled that the
disallowed loss would decrease the adjusted basis of the
partners' interests in the partnership which sold the property.
The loss is apportioned according to the partners' respective
shares of partnership losses. The second partnership later
sold the same property for more than its basis in the property
but the gain did not exceed the disallowed loss on the first
transaction. Under I.R.C. § 707(b)(1), 267(d), only gain on
the transaction in excess of the disallowed loss from the first
transaction is recognized; therefore, no gain is recognized by
the partnership on the second transaction. The IRS ruled that
the unrecognized gain is added to the partners' basis in their
partnership interests according to the partners' interest in
partnership profits. Rev. Rul. 96-10, I.R.B. 1996-2.
DISTRIBUTIONS. The IRS has issued proposed rules
governing the treatment of a distribution of marketable
securities by a partnership. Under I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) a
partner must recognize gain on a distribution of money from
the partnership to the extent the money received exceeds the
partner's basis in the partner's partnership interest. Under
I.R.C. § 731(c), marketable securities are to be treated as
money for purposes of Section 731(a). Under I.R.C. §
731(c)(3)(B), the amount of marketable securities that is
treated as money is reduced by the excess of (1) the partner's
share of the net gain of the securities of the same class and
issuer over (2) the partner's share of such net gain
immediately after the distribution. The proposed regulations
provide that all securities held by the partnership are to be
treated as the same class and issuer. The proposed
regulations also provide that  marketable securities include
an interest in a entity of which 90 percent or more of the
assets are  marketable securities. In addition, marketable
securities include an interest in an entity if the interest in the
entity is attributable to marketable securities owned by the
entity which comprise 20 percent or more but less than 90
percent of the assets of the entity. The proposed regulations
provide three exceptions. (1) The marketable securities rules
do not apply if the distributee partner contributed the
marketable securities to the partnership. (2) The marketable
securities rules do not apply if the partnership acquired the
marketable securities in a nonrecognition transaction in
exchange for property other than marketable securities or
cash and (a) the security is actively traded and (b) the
security is distributed within five years after acquisition. (3)
The marketable securities rules do not apply if (a) the
security was not actively traded when acquired by the
partnership, (b) the security was actively traded at the time
of distribution, and (c) the security became actively trade
more than six months after acquisition by the partnership
and (d) the security was distributed within five years after
the date the security became actively traded. The marketable
securities rules do not apply to investment partnerships. 61
Fed. Reg. 28 (Jan. 2, 1996), adding Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.731-2.
RETURNS. The IRS has issued temporary regulations
governing the issuance of automatic four month extensions
for filing and paying federal income tax. The regulations
generally implement Notice 93-22, 1993-1 C.B. 305 but the
regulations do not require that a taxpayer be unable to make
the tax payments on the date of the extension. The IRS
encouraged taxpayers to make as large a payment as
possible by the due date in order to reduce interest and
penalties. 61 Fed. Reg. 260 (Jan. 4, 1996).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
January 1996
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.50 5.43 5.39 5.37
110% AFR 6.06 5.97 5.93 5.90
120% AFR 6.63 6.52 6.47 6.43
Mid-term
AFR 5.73 5.65 5.61 5.58
110% AFR 6.32 6.22 6.17 6.14
120% AFR 6.89 6.78 6.72 6.69
Long-term
AFR 6.19 6.10 6.05 6.02
110% AFR 6.82 6.71 6.65 6.62
120% AFR 7.45 7.32 7.25 7.21
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELECTION. The taxpayer was a shareholder of a
corporation which claimed to have timely filed a From 2553
Subchapter S Election for 1986. However, the IRS claimed
to have not received the form. The taxpayer presented
extensive testimony by the form preparer that the form was
timely mailed, and the Tax Court acknowledged that this
testimony was believable. However, the court held that a
presumption of delivery was not available to the taxpayer
and that the requirements of I.R.C. § 7502 were the only
means of proving delivery of a mailing. Section 7502
requires direct evidence of a postmark on the document
involved, which the court stated could only be met, in cases
of lost documents, by the record of registered or certified
mail. The taxpayer also presented some evidence that the
IRS had later mailed forms to the taxpayer with information
allegedly obtainable only from the disputed Form 2553, thus
proving IRS receipt of the Form 2553. The court rejected the
significance of this evidence because the taxpayer failed to
demonstrate that the information was not supplied to the IRS
by some other means. As the Tax Court warns at the end of
the opinion, taxpayers assume the full risk of IRS's
nonreceipt or loss of filings unless the filings are mailed by
registered or certified mail. Carroll v. Comm'r, 96-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,010 (6th Cir. 1995), aff'g, T.C.
Memo. 1994-229.
INADVERTENT TERMINATION. A shareholder of an
S corporation distributed shares of stock to a trust which had
the shareholder's two children as co-beneficiaries, causing
the corporation to no longer qualify as an S corporation. The
corporation did not learn this until the corporation's income
tax return was prepared. The shareholder immediately
reformed the trust into two separate trusts, each with one
beneficiary, and language requiring annual distribution of
income to the sole beneficiary and prohibiting distribution of
trust principal except to the sole beneficiary. The IRS ruled
that the new trusts were QSSTs and that the termination of S
corporation status was inadvertent; therefore, the
corporation was allowed to continue as an S corporation so
long as all parties filed income tax returns consistent with an
S corporation election. Ltr. Rul. 9552031, Sept. 29, 1995.
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS
P.O. BOX 50703
EUGENE, OR 97405
16
JOURNAL ARTICLES
The San Joaquin Agricultural Law Review, Vol. 5, No.
1 (1995) contains the following articles:
Bensing, Daniel,  "The Promulgation and
Implementation of Federal Marketing Orders Regulating
Fruit and Vegetable Crops Under the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937."
Leighton, Brian C., "The Socialization of Agricultural
Advertising: What Peristroika Didn't Do the First
Amendment Will."
Osler, Lois Bonsal, "An Overview of Federal Milk
Marketing Orders."
Padberg, Daniel I. and Hall, Charles, "The Economic
Rationale for Marketing Orders."
Pineles, Barry, "Marketing Orders and the
Administrative Process: Fitting Round Fruit into Square
Baskets."
CITATION UPDATES
Crisp v. United States, 34 Fed. Cls. 112 (1995)
(distributable net income) see Vol. 6, p. 157.
Estate of Green v. United States, 68 F.3d 151 (6th
Cir. 1995) (gross estate) see Vol. 6, p. 182.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
ISSUE INDEX
Bankruptcy
General
Automatic stay 10
Claims 10
Environmental cleanup costs 10
Exemptions
  IRA 10
Federal taxation
Claims 11
Priority 11
Contracts
Termination 11
Federal Agricultural Programs
Brucellosis 11
Cheese 11
Disaster assistance 11
Inspector general 12
Milk 12
PACA 12
Federal Estate and Gift Tax
Gift 13
Installment payment of estate tax 13
Power of attorney 13
Federal Income Taxation
Assignment of income 13
C corporations
Reorganizations 13
Discharge of indebtedness 13
Hobby losses 14
IRA 14
Investment tax credit 14
Interest 14
Letter rulings 14
Like-kind exchange  14
Partnerships
Basis of partner's interest 14
Distributions 15
Returns 15
Safe harbor interest rates
January 1996 15
S corporations
Election 15
 Inadvertent termination 15
